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PATRIOTIC RACISM:
AN INVESTIGATION INTO JUDICIAL
RHETORIC AND THE CONTINUED
LEGAL DIVESTITURE OF
NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS
ANDREA WALLACE*
"It is difficult to get a man to understand some-
thing when his salary depends on his not under-
standing it." -Upton Sinclair1
INTRODUCTION
Americans live in a country where race was once legally insti-
tutionalized. 2 In fact, it was only 50 years ago that the United
States' legal system officially ceased to operate as a mechanism
* Ph.D. Candidate in Cultural Heritage Law, University of Glasgow School
of Law, Expected 2017; LL.M. in European Business Law, cum laude,
Radboud University, May 2014; J.D., magna cum laude, DePaul University
College of Law, May 2014; B.F.A, The School of the Art Institute of Chicago,
May 2006. Thank you to Professor Susan Bandes for her invaluable consulta-
tion throughout the writing process and for her guidance and editorial sug-
gestions, and to Professor Zoe Robinson for her advice and comments on the
topic of the article. A special thanks to Sarah Wilson for providing feedback
as a sounding board during this article's development.
I UPTON SINCLAIR, I, CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR: AND How I GOT
LICKED 109 (1934).
2 For an in depth discussion of Native American history, politics and culture,
See generally DAVID E. WILKINS & HEIDI KIIWETINEPINESIIK STARK, Ameri-
can Indian Politics and the American Political System (Rowman & Littlefield
eds. 2011); WILLIAM A. BROPHY & SOPHIE D. ABERLE, INDIAN LAw/RACE
LAW: A FIVE-HUNDRED YEAR HISTORY (2001); JAMES E. FALKOWSKI, THE
INDIAN, AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
THE RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN
(1992); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHN-
1
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that explicitly condoned racism. Yet, the passage of 50 years has
done little to mute a historic pattern of racial oppression vested
centuries ago amid this country's conception. Nor does it imply
an eradication of racism, regardless of how unpopular racial dis-
crimination may have become. As one historian has stated,
"[t]here is not a country in world history in which racism has
been more important, for so long a time, as the United States." 3
Today, racism may be discouraged and socially abhorred, but it
remains an important emotional component of the United
States' recent and traditional history. As evidence of apparent
racism grows scarce due to progressive social efforts to expunge
its existence, the study of emotions underlying racial bias be-
comes fundamental in understanding how racism continues to
permeate and shape societal values.
Naturally, problems occur with even assigning a definition to
racism. Merriam-Webster defines racism as "a belief that race is
the primary determinant of human traits and capacities and that
racial difference produces an inherent superiority of a particular
race. ' '4 Other sources describe it as hatred of one person by an-
other because of skin color, language, customs, place of birth, or
any other factor that supposedly reveals the basic nature of that
person. 5 Modern characterizations have expanded racism to en-
compass practices and actions in addition to individual or social
views.6 To further complicate the matter, assigning an appropri-
ate definition requires an initial analysis of what qualifies as
QUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN
AMERICA (2005).
3 HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 48-52
(2005).
4 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster
.com/dictionary/racism (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).
5 Racism, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, http://archive.adl.org/hate-patrol/ra
cism.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).
6 Racism, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Racism (last visited Jan.
15, 2015). I chose to specifically refer to Wikipedia in this instance, because
the website operates by social contributions and aims to draw from contem-
porary norms.
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PATRIOTIC RACISM
"race" and what does or does not constitute discrimination. 7
This paper finds the following definition particularly useful:
"culturally sanctioned beliefs which, regardless of the intentions
involved, defend the advantages Whites have because of the
subordinated positions of racial minorities."8
Regardless of how racism is defined, the strong emotional re-
actions to being labeled a "racist" are unavoidable. Today, ra-
cism is undesirable in any form. Even identifying racism
inevitably invokes a defensive reaction. So, then, how do we ini-
tially become comfortable enough to confront its existence in
order to promote social progress, especially where such progress
is long overdue? Do we assign a different term to describe con-
temporary racism? Or do we change the system by which we
evaluate race?
It must be stressed at the outset that this paper focuses on
unconscious racism and the psychological dynamics of tradi-
tional attitudes toward Native Americans.9 It does not attempt
7 Id.
8 DAVID WELLMAN, PORTRAITS OF WHITE RACISM xvii (1977).
9 Throughout this article, I use "Native American" for a neutral and more
historically accurate classification of indigenous peoples to the United States.
Assigning the proper term is an ongoing dispute, which dates back to the first
individual to encounter American peoples. Erroneously, Columbus thought
he had arrived in the "Indies," but in actuality he had set foot in the Carib-
bean Islands. Thus, the term "Indian" developed out of a misunderstanding
of the indigenous people's actual identity. Id.
Objectors to "Indian" or "American Indian" point to the fact that the term
does not accurately reflect the identity of the person, or tribe, to whom it
refers. An ideal approach would identify indigenous persons by tribal affilia-
tion; however, for the purposes of this paper, such a task becomes inundating
since there are more than 550 federally recognized tribes in existence. Nor is
it sufficient when referring to indigenous persons as an organized, collective
group. It was the U.S. government that coined the term "Native American"
in the 1970s as an alternative to "American Indian." Clyde Tucker, Brian
Kojetin, & Roderick Harrison, A Statistical Analysis of the CPS Supplement
on Race and Ethnic Origin (May 1995), BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTIcs, Bu-
REAU OF THE CENSUS. Yet, the term "Native American" is over inclusive in
that it refers to indigenous persons of North and South America, as well as
Alaskan and Hawaiian Natives. Those who prefer "American Indian" to
Volume 8, Number I Winter 201+
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to accuse or label persons as "racist," but rather to reveal how
perceived prejudices toward Native Americans have become ra-
tionalized and imbedded in legal discourse.10 This specific di-
mension of emotion in legal attitudes, particularly in racially
sensitive cases, has not been adequately examined. In the past,
courts have eradicated racism reaching obvious levels under po-
litical pressure or during periods relevant to popular social
movements. People commonly associate "racism" with a histori-
cal understanding of slavery and Jim Crow forms of de facto and
de jure racial discrimination against African Americans.'1 How-
ever, civil rights movements regarding Native Americans and
other minority groups12 have never reached the effective levels
of those by African Americans. 13 Native Americans comprise
"Native American" often do so because the later is viewed as a phrase con-
trived by government regulators. Brendan Koerner, American Indian vs. Na-
tive American, SLATE, (Sept. 24, 2004, 7:31 AM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/newsand-politics/explainer/2004/09/american indian vs native am
erican.html.
Since this paper focuses on language and rhetoric, the more neutral term
"Native Americans" is used consistently unless the original choice of lan-
guage under discussion requires otherwise. While this is an imperfect term, it
is utilized strategically to highlight rhetoric engaging other, and often dispar-
aging, terms.
10 For a lengthy discussion regarding unconscious racism, see Eduardo
Bonilla-Silva, Racism Without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persis-
tence of Racial Inequality in America (2006).
11 See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus's Legacy: Law as an Instrument of
Racial Discrimination Against Indigenous People's Rights of Self-Determina-
tion 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 51, 53 (1991); see also, WINTHROP D. JOR-
DAN, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN: HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF RACISM IN THE
UNITED STATES (1974); KENNETH STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION;
SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH (1956); C. VAN WOODARD, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (2d ed. 1966).
12 In the 2010 census, Hispanics comprised 16 percent of the U.S. popula-
tion, African Americans represented 13 percent, the Asian population com-
prised 5 percent, with Native Americans and Hawaiian Natives representing
less than 1 percent of the population. THE UNITED STATES CENSUS 2010,
http://www.census.gov/2010census/news/releases/operations/cbll-cn125.html
(last visited Jan. 15, 2015).
13 Williams argues that racism toward Native Americans takes the form of
cultural racism, rather than biological racism, and "is therefore a primary
Volume 8, Number I Winter 201+
4
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol8/iss1/6
95 PATRIOTIC RACISM
less than one percent of the United States population 14 and, as a
result, are required to advocate perceived injustices before the
court, instead of hoping to assemble enough social momentum
to effectuate change.
Even so, these legal challenges have been largely unsuccessful
due to enduring historical misunderstandings or pursuant to a
legal denial of justice. By their very purpose, suits brought by
Native Americans often challenge a nationalist perception of
the United States' conception, its legal foundation, and related
patriotic sentiment. As these notions are advocated, responsive
negative attitudes can become repressed and transform into
background emotions. To fully understand any emotional im-
pact, the role played by the non-conscious processes in judicial
attitudes is initially considered. These attitudes disclose a variety
of underlying emotions difficult to relinquish in the pursuit of
neutral cognition. Among these emotions, this paper specifically
addresses the appearance of resentment, loyalty, and shame
evolving in the legal discourse regarding Native Americans.
Emotions underlie the rhetoric intentionally selected to address
a legal issue; such language becomes dicta, precedents, and ulti-
mately law. Focusing on reoccurring themes of resentment, loy-
alty, and shame, this paper examines three legal opinions, under
an emotional lens, in relation to the judicial course of action
taken and the ultimate legal outcome of each case.
Consequently, this paper seeks to make evident how legal
rhetoric in discussions of Native American rights is "extraordi-
narily negative, focusing mainly on the threat posed by recogniz-
ing such rights." 15 Such rhetoric resists challenges posed to
traditional values, beliefs, and prevailing customs, while sus-
distinguishing characteristic of many of the legalized forms of racial discrimi-
nation directed against indigenous tribal peoples in the United States." See
Williams, supra note 11, at 54.
14 See UNITED STATES CENSUS, supra note 12.
15 Ashley Young, Continuing an American Legacy of Racial and Cultural In-
justice: A Critical Look at Bonnichsen v. United States, 17 DEPAUL-LCA J.
ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 1, 23 (2006).
Volume8, Number I Winter 201+
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taining a vested interest in building upon precedent established
by centuries of Federal Indian Law. 16 This unintentional admin-
istration of racism has become an unconscious practice that con-
tinues to create a real-life impact on Native American culture,
with real-life consequences. As our social conception of racism
has evolved, the evolution of racial prejudice has followed suit,
becoming more implicit and undistinguishable, thus harder to
confront. Judicial rhetoric becomes significant because it shows
how racism situates itself in cultural understandings of race-
and in this case, both how racism appears in legal observations
of Native American culture and how rhetoric portrays the histo-
ries of Native Americans that, while blatantly false, were
presented as factual and engendered substantial legal conse-
quences. Such an examination is proper and long overdue, con-
sidering that historically, the legal process has placed Native
Americans in the circumstances for which they appear before
the court.
OVERVIEW
"Our nation was born in genocide when it em-
braced the doctrine that the original American,
the Indian, was an inferior race. Even before there
were large numbers of Negroes on our shore, the
scar of racial hatred had already disfigured colo-
nial society. From the sixteenth century forward,
blood flowed in battles over racial supremacy. We
are perhaps the only nation which tried as a mat-
ter of national policy to wipe out its indigenous
population. Moreover, we elevated that tragic ex-
perience into a noble crusade. Indeed, even today
we have not permitted ourselves to reject or feel
remorse for this shameful episode. Our literature,
16 Carole Goldberg & Kevin K. Washburn, Introduction, in INDIAN LAW STO-
RIES 1 - 25 (Carole Goldberg et al. eds. 2010).
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97 PATRIOTIC RACISM
our films, our drama, our folklore all exalt it. Our
children are still taught to respect the violence
which reduced a red-skinned people of an earlier
culture into a few fragmented groups herded into
impoverished reservations." -Martin Luther
King, Jr.17
All forms of racism, which are specific to each race, merit
their own emotional and historical analysis. This paper investi-
gates emotions that underlie racism by focusing on how uncon-
scious racism has affected the legal regulation of Native
American inequality. In order to understand this country's foun-
dational history with Native Americans, Part I describes the his-
torical treatment and cultural misunderstanding of this nation's
first inhabitants. Part II discusses theories of emotions as a plau-
sible approach to understand how racism has been established
and rationalized into the unconscious, and to suggest an attempt
toward how these emotions could be confronted and used to ac-
tualize progress. Part III then examines the specific emotions of
resentment, loyalty and shame present in judicial opinions as-
sessing Native American rights. The paper concludes with sug-
gestions for future attempts to bring racism into the foreground
without creating a reaction that is counter-productive.
1. UNIQUE HISTORY WITH NATIVE AMERICANS
"The study of history is a powerful antidote to
contemporary arrogance. It is humbling to dis-
cover how many of our glib assumptions, which
seem to us novel and plausible, have been tested
before, not once but many times and in innumera-
ble guises; and discovered to be, at great human
cost, wholly false." -Paul Johnson18
17 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 120 (1964).
18 PAUL JOHNSON, THE QUOTABLE PAUL JOHNSON: A TOPICAL COMPILA-
TION OF His WIT, WISDOM, AND SATIRE. THE RECOVERY OF FREEDOM 138
Volume 8, Number 1 Winter 201+-
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Before turning to the focus of this paper, it is necessary to
consider the indigenous race in its historical and foundational
context, originating from the first contact with Europeans over
500 years ago. Traditionally, racism was a fact of life. It was in-
tentional and consciously practiced. Like other forms of racism,
explicit racism toward Native Americans has become implicit
over time and under changing societal values. This section dis-
cusses how the founding of this country was based on racial as-
sumptions that were historically recorded as fact, and still have
not been redefined as personal, or societal, racist opinions. Most
racism in its present form has become unintentional and uncon-
scious. Until these assumptions are brought forth as incorrect
and blatantly wrong, they will continue to underlie the United
States' historical foundation.
Persons inhabiting the Americas have been misrepresented
from the moment of its "discovery" in 1492. Reports from the
New World such as that of the Dominican Tomas Ortiz to the
Council of the Indies in 1525 claimed that:
On the mainland they eat human flesh. They are
more given to sodomy than any other nation.
There is no justice among them. They go naked.
They have no respect either for love or for virgin-
ity. They are stupid and silly. They have no respect
for truth, save when it is to their advantage. They
are unstable. They have no knowledge of what
foresight means . . . They are incapable of learn-
ing. Punishments have no effect upon them. Trai-
(George J. Marlin, et al. eds. 1994). Paul Johnson, a British historian, has
published over 40 books including: A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY (1977), A
HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE (1987), INTELLECTUALS (1988), THE
BIRTH OF THE MODERN: WORLD SOCIETY, 1815-1830 (1991), MODERN
TIMES: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD FROM THE 1920S TO THE YEAR 2000
(1999), A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1997), A HISTORY OF THE
JEWS AND ART: A NEW HISTORY (2003) AS WELL AS BIOGRAPHIES OF ELIZA-
BETH I (1974), NAPOLEON (2002), GEORGE WASHINGTON (2005) AND POPE
JOHN PAUL 11 (1982).
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torous, cruel, and vindictive, they never forgive.
Most hostile to religion, idle, dishonest, abject,
and vile, in their judgments they keep no faith or
law. . . They eat fleas, spiders, and worms raw,
whenever they find them. They exercise none of
the humane arts or industries. When taught the
mysteries of our religion, they say that these things
may suit Castilians, but not them, and they do not
wish to change their customs... The older they get
the worse they become... I may therefore affirm
that God has never created a race more full of vice
and composed without the least mixture of kind-
ness or culture... We here speak of those whom
we know by experience. Especially the father, Pe-
dro de Cordoba, who has sent me these facts in
writing.., the Indians are more stupid than asses
and refuse to improve in anything.' 9
Even the founding fathers promoted cultural racism toward
natives. In 1779, George Washington referred to Native Ameri-
cans as "beasts of prey," and instructed his subordinate to "at-
tack the Iroquois and lay waste all the settlements around" and
not to consider "any overture of peace before the total ruin of
their settlement is effected. (sic)"20 Thomas Jefferson instructed
his Secretary of War in 1807 to use "the hatchet" against Native
Americans who resisted westward encroachment into their tri-
bal lands writing, "[a]nd if ever we are constrained to lift the
hatchet against any tribe, we will never lay it down till that tribe
is exterminated." 21 Jefferson became the first president to pro-
19 WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND/WHITE MAN'S LAW: THE
PAST AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 9 (1995).
20 DAVID E. STANNARD, AMERICAN HOLOCAUST: THE CONQUEST OF THE
NEW WORLD 119 (1992); see also David V. Baker, American Executions in
Historical Context, 20 CRIM. JUST. STUD. 315, 317-373 (2007).
21 Id. at 120.
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ritories comprising the Louisiana Purchase. 22
Andrew Jackson, who pioneered the mass removal of Native
Americans, referred to Indians as "savage dogs" and scalped
those he killed in his purge of the Cherokee.2 3 In his campaign
against the Creek, Jackson personally oversaw "the mutilation
of 800 or so Creek Indian corpses-the bodies of men, women,
and children, that he and his men massacred-cutting off their
noses to count and preserve a record of the dead, slicing long
strips of flesh from their bodies to tan and turn into bridle
reins."24 Under Jackson's encouragement, Congress passed the
Indian Removal Act in May of 1830, allowing States to force-
fully relocate Native Americans living within their borders by
divesting them of their property rights and protections under
State law.25 Historical accounts of the Indian Removal Act de-
scribe it as authorizing Jackson to "negotiate" with Native
Americans. These negotiations resulted in their forced reloca-
tion to Federal territory west of the Mississippi in return for
their fertile homelands.
Even prior to the enactment of the Indian Removal Act,
States actively sought the removal of Native Americans in order
to appropriate their tribal land. States had begun implementing
laws that divested Native Americans of rights, expecting that the
Federal Government would not enforce the promised removal.
For example, in 1828, the Georgia legislature enacted a series of
statutes stripping the Cherokee Nation of all rights and protec-
tions.26 In protest, the Cherokee Nation sought access to the Su-
22 Id.
23 Baker, supra note 20, at 319.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 7-14 (1831). Chief Justice Marshall
even recognized, "[tihe effect of these laws, and their purposes, are stated to
be to parcel out the territory of the Cherokees; to extend all the laws of
Georgia; over the same; to abolish the Cherokee laws, and to deprive the
Cherokees of the protection of their laws ... "
Volume 8, Number 1
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preme Court to obtain an injunction against Georgia's laws.27
However, the Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
despite explicitly recognizing Georgia's injustices.28 In his opin-
ion, Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
If courts were permitted to indulge their sympa-
thies, a case better calculated to excite them can
scarcely be imagined. A people once numerous,
powerful, and truly independent, found by our an-
cestors in the quiet and uncontrolled possession of
an ample domain, gradually sinking beneath our
superior policy, our arts and our arms, have
yielded their lands by successive treaties, each of
which contains a solemn guarantee of the residue,
until they retain no more of their formerly exten-
sive territory than is deemed necessary to their
comfortable subsistence. To preserve this remnant,
the present application is made.29
Nevertheless, Marshall determined the Cherokee Nation
lacked constitutional standing, explaining, "'[f]oreign nations' is
a general term, the application of which to Indian tribes, when
used in the American constitution, is at best extremely question-
able." 30 He explained that the Framers had not intended for the
actual meaning of "foreign nation" to attach, as it was plainly
perceived that the Constitution presumed a tribe could not be a
nation because it was not foreign to the United States.31 Ac-
cordingly, Marshall rationalized "[i]f it be true that the Chero-
kee nation have rights, this is not the tribunal in which those
rights are to be asserted. If it be true that wrongs have been
27 Id. at 2.
28 The Cherokee Nation sought redress as a foreign nation, under the origi-
nal jurisdiction granted to the Supreme Court by the Constitution. Id.
29 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. at 15.
30 Id. at 19.
31 Id.
Volume 8, Number 1 Winter 2014-
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inflicted, and that still are greater to be apprehended, this is not
the tribunal which can redress the past or prevent the future." 32
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia closed the courthouse doors to
the Cherokee Nation because it was not a "foreign nation" enti-
tled to bring suit under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court-nor were the Native Americans considered citizens of
the United States. 33 Finding that the Removal Act had ulti-
mately authorized the Cherokees' ejection, Marshall wrote,
"[t]hey occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent
of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when
their right of possession ceases." 34 The court enforced removal
opened up more than 25 million acres for predominantly white
settlement, and Jackson's efforts to "negotiate" resulted in the
1838 death march famously known as the Trail of Tears.
Historically, overt and obvious racism existed in Federal In-
dian Law due to the general acceptance of Native American ste-
reotypes both in the courtroom and in society. Courts
repeatedly rejected claims of sovereignty, finding Nations and
individuals35 lacked standing, and contended they were "nothing
more than wandering hordes, held together only by ties of blood
and habit, and having neither laws or government, beyond what
is required in a savage state." 36 Even in the twentieth century,
courts referred to Native Americans as an "ignorant and depen-
dent race." 37 Justices felt that the "uncivilized Indians" lacked a
recognizable nationhood, "[o]wing to the natural infirmities of
the Indian character, their fiery tempers, impatience of restraint,
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 17.
35 Id. at 20. Even in criminal courts, Native American women had no legal
standing; 'an Indian woman's testimony regarding rape meant nothing in a
white court of law. Her testimony could not convict a white man.' See also
David V. Baker, American Executions in Historical Context, 20 CRIM. JUST.
STUD. 315, 317-373 (2007) (citing Brownmiller, 1975, p 162). This would also
require that the State brought suit on behalf of the woman.
36 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S at 27 (Johnson, J., concurring).
37 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
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their mutual jealousies and animosities, their nomadic habits,
and lack of mental training .".38
The Executive supported this attitude. In 1900, Theodore
Roosevelt wrote, "the settler and pioneer have at bottom had
justice on their side; this great continent could not have been
kept as nothing but a game preserve for squalid savages." 39 In
1913, the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Government's
power over Native American affairs extended to tribes because
of their "racial" characteristics, including intellectual and moral
inferiority.40 Even today, both Congress and the executive
branch, particularly the Bureau of Indian Affairs, continue to
rely upon foundational doctrine from the 1830s in regards to
trust responsibility, domestic dependent nations, tribal sover-
eignty, limitations on state powers and the supremacy and sanc-
tity of treaties.41
These judicial views have continued to affect how Native
American rights are regarded in the present century. Though
slavery was abolished in 1865, and freedmen were granted the
right to vote in 1870,42 with women following in 1920, 43 none of
these rights extended to Native Americans 44 until they were fi-
nally granted citizenship in 1924 with the Indian Citizenship
Act.45 Even so, their right to vote was not completely resolved
until 1975.46 This full legal recognition of Native American
38 Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 265 (1901).
39 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE WINNING OF THE WEST 201 (1896).
40 United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 41 (1913).
41 Rennard Strickland, The Tribal Struggle for Indian Sovereignty: The Story
of the Cherokee Cases, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 61 (Carole Goldberg et al.
eds. 2010).
42 U.S. Const. amend. XV.
43 U.S. Const. amend. XIX.
44 Some treaties extended certain exceptions through Federal Indian Law.
See STEPHEN L. PREVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES (4th ed.
2012).
45 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2000).
46 See Goodluck v. Apache County, 417 F.Supp. 13 (D.Ariz. 1975). Until the
1965 Voting Rights Act, states determined whether Native Americans were
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rights is a modern concept that has only recently begun to be
embraced by current society.
II. EMOTIONS UNDERLYING CULTURAL RACISM
"That tradition - the song, the cheer - it mat-
tered so much to me as a child, and I know it mat-
ters to every other Redskins fan in the D.C. area
and across the nation. Our past isn't just where we
came from - it's who we are ... The name was
never a label. It was, and continues to be, a badge
of honor. I respect the opinions of those who disa-
gree. I want them to know that I do hear them,
and I will continue to listen and learn. But we can-
not ignore our 81-year history, or the strong feel-
ings of most of our fans as well as Native
Americans throughout the country. After 81
years, the team name 'Redskins' continues to hold
the memories and meaning of where we came
from, who we are, and who we want to be in the
years to come. We are Redskins Nation and we
owe it to our fans and coaches and players, past
and present, to preserve that heritage." -Dan
Snyder 47
"Embedded in the idea of race is a socially constructed debate
over what it means to be a human being; embedded in the idea
of racism is a debate over what it means to be a just democratic
allowed to vote. Even after enacting the VRA, states continued to disen-
franchise the Native American vote by hinging the right on the payment of
taxes within the state.
47 Statement by the owner of the Washington Redskins. See Kevin Ewoldt,
Dan Snyder: We'll Never Change the Name. It's That Simple. NEVER - You
Can Use Caps. HOGs HEAVEN, (MAY 9, 2013, 5:05 PM), http://www.hogsha
ven.com/2013/5/9/4316710/dan-snyder.
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community."48 Hence, arguments regarding racial justice and
appropriate remedies represent the "clash of competing" White
American49 visions of the causes and effects of disparate out-
comes toward Native Americans, and the portrayal of what the
good and just response to those disparities is through the law50
In school, children are taught that Native Americans were mere
inhabitants of the vacant land discovered and conquered by
righteous European settlers. These colonialists brought peace,
religion and civilization to the Native Americans who, in ex-
change, willingly gave up their land for modern technology and
an opportunity to live an improved and educated life. Yet, in
reality, Native Americans engaged in wars to keep their lands,
challenged State acts in court and risked extermination to pro-
tect their culture.51 Thus, extreme competing visions perpetuate
as to what a Native American is, and what rights a Native Amer-
ican is accorded under the law.
It remains unclear how such race-related concerns may mani-
fest in individual tendencies, but analyzing emotional responses
within reflexive understandings of race may shed light on this
issue.52 Judicial questioning during Supreme Court oral argu-
ments does provide some evidence of inherent racial assump-
tions. To illustrate, in Bryan v. Itasca County, a Chippewa
Native American brought suit claiming the State of Minnesota
lacked authority to impose a personal property tax on his mo-
48 Rhonda V. Magee, Toward an Integral Critical Approach to Thinking,
Talking, Writing, and Teaching About Race, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 259, 263
(2008).
49 The term "White American" is capitalized throughout this paper in an
effort to distinguish the phrase from its surrounding text and to draw atten-
tion to the classification where it is used.
50 Id.
51 See How We Know-Indians of the Midwest, THE NEWBERRY LIBRARY,
http://publications.newberry.org/indiansofthemidwest/indian-imagery/how-
we-know/.
52 See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers, Race and the Decision Making of Juries, 12
LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 171 (2007) (Sommers examines the
relationship between race and jury decision-making, which is relevant here).
Volume 8, Number I Winter 2014-
15
Wallace: Patriotic Racism: An Investigation into Judicial Rhetoric and the
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DePaul Journal for Social Justice 106
bile home located on reservation property. 53 As part of his oral
argument, the Chippewa posed this question: should he be pe-
nalized for purchasing a mobile home because "he is not rich
enough to put a foundation in, and concrete in the ground,"
making the mobile home the Chippewa's primary and only resi-
dence, where a wealthier person owning a mobile home in addi-
tion to a permanent home would not be penalized? In response,
Justice White tentatively asked the Native Americans' counsel
for confirmation as to whether the use of trailers was "consistent
with Indian tradition too, isn't it, to keep mobility?" 54
Within the complex context of contemporary racism, what be-
comes important to individual tendencies is what is not being
said, rather than what is. "Law is a central vehicle for the articu-
lation of the terms" and the method of debates on important
Native American issues-but as a means of addressing emotion-
ally charged social issues, the law has its limits. 55 The judicial
system has instituted concrete standards of review upon recog-
nizing racial discrimination in legislation. When a law lacks obvi-
ous discrimination, the court will examine its purpose and effect.
The mere fact that courts recognize that both overt and implicit
racism can exist in legislation demonstrates the likelihood that it
may also exist in the decision tendencies of judges. However,
this same system also empowers justices-who may be hesitant
to identify a racially motivated purpose-to rationalize away a
discriminatory law's purpose and effect, thereby desensitizing
the racial consequences.
It follows that before racism can be eradicated, it must first be
generally recognized. 56 Yet, racism is based on a wide variety of
53 Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
54 Transcript of Oral Argument at 22-23, Bryan, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (No. 75-
5027); See Amy Bowers & Kristen Carpenter, Challenging the Narrative of
Conquest: The Story of Lyng v. Northwest Indian, in INDIAN LAW STORIES
489, 511 (Carole Goldberg et al. eds. 2010).
55 Magee, supra note 48, at 263.
56 Richard McCulloch makes a provocative argument that we should rethink
the notion of racism and give it a positive meaning. McCulloch suggests a
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opposing emotions 7 Experiencing one emotion can simultane-
ously produce its opposite: love for patriotic White American
culture accompanied by hate for Native American injustices that
challenge the popular truth of how the great States were
founded. These contrasting emotions require a certain amount
of cognitive mitigation to harmonize. Such mitigation may en-
gage denial, rationalization or willful indifference to subdue the
original, racially inspired emotion. The more subdued these ra-
cial emotions become, the more difficult it becomes to root out
its source and the easier it is to deny its existence. As an effect
of this cognitive process, overcompensation [during attempts to
reason away these personal emotions] transforms into justifica-
tion. Thus it becomes important to recognize the emotions be-
hind racial perceptions to understand how racism functions in
order to eventually extinguish it-or at least to generate a signif-
icant difference in how the legal system approaches racial dis-
parity in the law.
Equally important, it seems that the oppressor and the op-
pressed can simultaneously experience racially related emotions,
such as shame, loyalty, self-righteousness and resentment. For
example, both parties may experience shame: shame internal-
ized by the White American as being responsible for racial op-
pression, and the shame experienced by the Native American
upon being identified worthy of oppression. White Americans
boast an intense passion for their land and loyalty to their re-
public, as do Native Americans, though the underlying values
regarding land and property could not be more different. Thus
form of "moral racism" in which allowing the recognition of race in a positive
manner opens up discussion looking toward change. But McCulloch points
out that the very concept of recognizing racism is viewed with suspicion and
doubt, or outright denied, in a culture like ours long conditioned to prohibit-
ing racial ideology. Thus, the only forms of racism commonly recognized as
existing, or even being possible, are immoral forms, and these usually are of
the most extreme varieties. Richard McCulloch, Right and Wrong Racism,
http://www.racialcompact.com/rightwrongracism.html (last visited Jan. 15,
2015).
57 Id.
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pride and loyalty are emotional counterparts in both Native and
White American society. But for White Americans, a certain
amount of denial facilitates these strong emotions: a denial for
the original sin of how the United States was constructed, and
how the legal system was used to justify the sin and paper over
the theft of land. Justices continue to rely on problematic factual
histories and overtly biased precedent to support legal
conclusions.
The United States has taken steps to admit and address his-
toric racism toward African Americans, yet racism toward Na-
tive Americans still has not gained sufficient recognition despite
the fact that it remains this country's oldest and most original
form of racism. For these reasons, the law should acknowledge
the prominent role of both conscious and unconscious processes
in shaping moral responses. 58 Finding the courage to make these
acknowledgements raises ethical considerations and takes
mental and emotional energy.59 As individuals struggle with cog-
nitive dissonance, the racial emotions become repressed and
transform to background emotions inhibiting the capacity to ex-
perience empathy and perspective-important emotions that sit-
uate actors in relationships and shape their social interactions.60
In furtherance, courts engage in motivated reasoning and create
legal fictions to rationalize unjust outcomes. Similar to legal pre-
cedent, these emotions become perpetual in legal reasoning.
Before turning to this precedent, the next section will briefly ad-
dress the emotions of resentment, loyalty and shame-emotions
that are highly relevant within judicial opinions.
Resentment
Resentment cultivated the initial conception of the legal di-
vestiture of Native American rights. Native Americans inhab-
58 Magee, supra note 48, at 263.
59 Id.
60 Id.
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ited the United States long before any European settler landed
on its shores. These settlers viewed land as relative to wealth,
and in the New World land was immensely available. Initially,
there seemed to be plenty for everyone. But as the population
grew and colonies expanded, colonists realized that Native
Americans possessed some of the most luscious and coveted ar-
eas: land that White Americans felt entitled to through Divine
Providence and Manifest Destiny. According to the colonists'
cultural beliefs regarding land and property, the Native Ameri-
cans took the land for granted and let it lay idle. This resentment
played a key role in White and Native American conflicts.61 The
colonists' resentment infected how social values developed and
became a catalyst in conflicts with the indigenous peoples. 62
Dr. Catherine West-Newman argues that resentment is one of
the many emotions said to arise out of "real, imagined, or antici-
pated outcomes in social relationships."63 Often seen as an emo-
tional response to an immoral act,64 resentment is also described
as "'an emotional apprehension' that 'acceptable, desirable,
61 As one author has stated, "The subject of Indian rights is also highly con-
troversial. Everyone familiar with it seems to have a strong opinion about it.
Some people resent the fact that Indians have special hunting, fishing and
water rights, for example. Others feel that Indians are simply exercising
rights which have always been theirs." STEPHEN L. PREVAR, THE RICHTS OF
INDIANS AND TRIBES (4th ed. 2012).
62 Cameron McCarthy, et al., Danger in the Safety Zone: Notes on Race, Re-
sentment, and the Discourse of Crime, Violence, and Suburban Security, 11
CULTURAL STUD 274-96 (1997). McCarthy and his colleagues draw on a re-
cent ethnographic study to show the material impact of the resentment dis-
course on crime and violence as relevant to the daily lives of black and
Latino youth. While the study's findings are contemporary, its reasoning is
relevant to historical social clashes with minority races, especially with Native
Americans.
63 THEODORE KEMPER, A SOCIAL INTERACTIONAL THEORY OF EMOTIONS
43 (1978). See e.g., Catherine Lane West-Newman, Feeling for Justice? Rights,
Laws, and Cultural Contexts, 30 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 305, 318-19 (2005).
Catherine West-Newman, a professor at the University of Auckland,
researches and writes about law, emotion, racism, and identity.
64 West-Newman contends that resentment emerges from a moral belief that
one has been treated wrongly. Id.
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proper, and rightful outcomes and procedures' permitting access
to capabilities, entitlements, and desired social outcomes have
not been followed."65 As such, it has been strongly advanced
that resentment is the key emotion that motivates people to
claim their social and legal rights. 66 Resentment also arouses ap-
prehension that others are receiving an undeserved advantage,
possibly "gained at the expense of what is desirable or accept-
able from the perspective of established rights." 67 From a West-
ern perspective, it is assumed that resentment is felt most
strongly upon a personal loss, but it is also universally accepted
that people may resent what they recognize as loss to their
group.68
Resentment has enabled justices to establish legal fictions that
resolve land distribution conflicts between White and Native
Americans. As White Americans came to resent Native Ameri-
cans for inhabiting the land, the latter came to resent the former
for expelling them from it. Legal fictions also served an equally
important purpose within the judiciary. After all, the first cases
bought by Native Americans that challenged the seizure of their
lands effectively petitioned a judge to undermine the judiciary's
newly secured authority by declaring such actions invalid. An
unpopular decision in favor of Native Americans would surely
be disregarded. To justify such seizure, and to protect the exer-
cise of judicial review, judges used rhetoric to convey a belief of
inherent and outright superiority over the Native Americans
they saw as challenging White Americans' entitlement to the
land-and their own authority in the judiciary. This specific
65 J. M. BARBALET, EMOTION, SOCIAL THEORY, AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE:
A MACROSOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 138 (1998). See e.g., West-Newman,
supra note 63.
66 West-Newman, supra note 63; ROBERT SOLOMON, A PASSION FOR JUS-
TICE; EMOTIONS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 137 (1990).
67 West-Newman, supra note 63.
68 Id.
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emotion will be investigated in the seminal land divestiture case
of Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh.69
Loyalty
Loyalty is a faithfulness or devotion to a person, group, coun-
try or cause. 70 It has empowered the judiciary to rationalize
away bad law, ignore previous injustices and remain faithful to
deeply-rooted misinterpretations of history. As Americans, jus-
tices experience loyalty to their nation, its history and the estab-
lishment of law, their livelihood and their own race.
Professor Susan Bandes7' studies loyalty to one's convictions
in the context of prosecutorial tunnel vision.72 She argues that in
many cases, prosecutors refuse to concede that the wrong per-
son was convicted even when evidence may exonerate the de-
fendant and prove his innocence. 73 This "refusal to accept that
an injustice occurred is often preceded by the refusal to admit
problems with the case or to remain open to additional evidence
during the investigative stage." 74 Importantly, it also deprives
the public of an apology.75 Bandes specifically focuses on the
prosecutor's tendency to develop a fierce loyalty to a particular
version of events and the guilt of a particular suspect or group of
suspects.76
69 Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
70 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionary/loyal (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).
71 Susan Bandes is known for her scholarly work in areas of federal jurisdic-
tion and criminal procedure, and more recently for her research in the
emerging study of law and emotion. See SUSAN BANDES, THE PASSIONS OF
LAW (1999).
72 Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One's Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel
Vision 49 How. L. J. 475-94 (2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=889129.
73 Id. at 475.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 479.
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This study is relevant in the context of Native American
rights, since White Americans continue to rationalize away in-
justices based upon a refusal to admit historic inaccuracies and
remain open to uncomfortable facts as truth. As Bandes pro-
poses, loyalty is shaped and continually reinforced within a so-
cial context:77 in the relevant context, White Americans have an
intense passion for their land and republic. To recognize that
blatant injustices occurred, and are still occurring, would pose
an emotional threat to the romantic understanding of how the
United States was formed. Loyalty to one's country and its per-
ceived foundation prevents recognition that what actually hap-
pened was fundamentally wrong, and that the shaping of the
legal system continues to accommodate for Native American in-
justices based on those falsehoods. Instead, loyalty to those fic-
tions and perspectives of justice enables motivated reasoning
when a court constructs justifications around intuitive judg-
ments, thereby creating an illusion of objective reasoning. 78
Thus, loyalty becomes a psychological mechanism to justify
where the law stands today.
This notion begins with loyalty to one's own group, deter-
mined by skin color, culture or tribe. As Native Americans feel
loyal to their tribes, religion and culture, Justices also exhibit
loyalty to their own race, religion and patriotic vision of their
country. This specific emotion will be investigated in Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association.79
77 Id. at 480.
78 Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intui-
tionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814-34 (2001).
79 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439
(1988).
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Shame
Shame is defined as a painful emotion caused by conscious-
ness of guilt, shortcoming or impropriety.80 In the author's opin-
ion, shame is the most important underlying emotion to racism:
it can be experienced personally or projected onto another.
Often, the absence of shame becomes important in judicial rhet-
oric, especially where such shame seems proper.
Dr. Elspeth Probyn81 asserts that individuals tend to want to
overcome or avoid shame in favor of pride.82 Experiencing
shame is important: it arises out of a personal interest in the
world and an obligation to society and stems from a desire for a
connection to that society which remains unfulfilled.8 3 Probyn
contends that people feel shame because they want that interest
to continue. 84 White Americans may experience shame or guilt
after engaging in racism. But unlike guilt, "shame requires a
deeper evaluation of the self because it concerns how others
think of us, but also how we see ourselves." 85 Further, guilt may
80 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster
.com/dictionary/shame (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).
81 Elspeth Probyn is a professor of gender and cultural studies at the Univer-
sity of Sydney.
82 See ELSPETH PROBYN, BLUSH: FACES OF SHAME (2005); See also Rachel
Slocum, The Embodied Politics of Pain in US Anti-Racism, 8 ACME: An E
Journal of Critical Geographies 18, 36 (2009), available at http://mccaughey
centre.unimelb.edu.au/data/assets/pdfjfile/0013/213610/Slocum_2009.pdf.
83 Slocum, supra note 82; "[O]ne might say that shame is the deeply felt and
highly motivating experience of the fear of being judged defective. It is the
anxious experience of either the real or anticipated loss of status, affection or
self-regard that results from knowing that one is vulnerable to the disapprov-
ing gaze or negative judgment of others. It is a terror that touches the mind,
the body, and the soul precisely because one is aware that one might be seen
to have come up short in relationship to some shared and uncontested ideal
that defines what it means to be a good, worthy, admirable, attractive, or
competent person, given one's status or position in society." See West-New-
man, supra note 63, at 323, (quoting Richard A. Shweder, Toward a Deep
Cultural Psychology of Shame, 70 Soc. RES. 1109, 1115 (2003).
84 Slocum, supra note 82.
85 Id. at 37.
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be satisfied by apology thereby relieving a sense of personal re-
sponsibility, but shame has the ability to solidify internally and
remain indefinitely.86 Though a difference remains between
shaming by others and having one's own sense of shame, both
forms exist in the context of racism.
Other theorists characterize shame more generally as a re-
sponse to "the tension between one's ego ideal and one's actual
performance, that is, between what one desires and what one
can actually attain."87 Thus, Native Americans may experience
shame at the denial of justice in court. Simultaneously, judges
may experience shame upon a desire to effectuate change, but a
realization that true justice is unattainable due to the historical
legacy or constraints on the law. These frustrations give rise to
shame, which can provoke externalization of blame or other re-
sponses 88 toward Native Americans, as well as a reduced capac-
ity for empathy. 89 Thus, shame is a basic emotion that motivates
social and moral line drawing,90 especially considering how indi-
vidual judges rationalize the presence of racial injustice in the
law.
Shame has had its own repercussions on Native American so-
ciety: experiencing repetitive injustices and apparent social dis-
dain can precipitate negative motivations for not pursuing future
legal action. Even if legal action is desired, claimants may forgo
86 Id.
87 See Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Re-
form, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 4, 645, 659-660 (1997); GERHART PIERS
& MILTON B. SINGER, SHAME & GUILT: A PSYCHOANALYTIC AND CUL-
TURAL STUDY (1971).
88 June Price Tangney, et al., Are Shame, Guilt and Embarrassment Distinct
Emotions? 70 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 1256 (1996); See, e.g.,
Toni M. Massaro, Show (Some) Emotion, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 80-120
(Susan Bandes ed. 1999).
89 Janice Lundsay-Hartz, et al., Differentiating Guilt and Shame and Their
Effects of Motivation, in SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
SHAME, GUILT, EMBARRASSMENT, AND PRIDE 274, 296 (Jessica L. Tracy et
al. eds. 1995).
90 Slocum, supra note 82.
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its pursuit and assume that justice is unattainable based on prior
experiences. This specific emotion will be applied to State v. Wil-
liams9l and opinions regarding Native Americans in criminal
law.
III. JUDICIAL EMOTIONS IN NATIVE AMERICAN LAW
"Justice will not be served until those who are un-
affected are as outraged as those who are."
-Benjamin Franklin92
Legalized forms of racial discrimination are deeply rooted in
history and a cultural attachment and devotion to one's country.
This underlying patriotism demonstrates that there is strong
emotional component to the practice of racism toward cultures
that conflict with our own. However, instead of pointing any fin-
ger at the judicial system, this section aims to examine rhetoric
through a cultural lens of "emotional racism" in an effort to re-
veal how unconscious processes have shaped judicial responses
to Native American rights. Because prevailing economic and po-
litical interests often determine courses for judicial action, ques-
tions of how Native Americans should be treated are shaped by
the contextual considerations of that time-as are the judges,
who are a product of this culture. Accordingly, this section will
examine the emotions of resentment, loyalty and shame as foun-
dations for recurring themes relevant to patriotism and its en-
trenchment in judicial rhetoric as contextual justification.
Resentment: Johnson v. M'Intosh, (1823)
As the population in the New World grew, so did its need of
more land. This property crisis between White and Native
Americans culminated in 1823, during Johnson and Graham's
91 State v. Williams, 484 P.2d 1167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
92 Benjamin Franking was a founding father and leading politician during
the original development of the United States.
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Lessee v. M'Intosh.93 In Johnson, two parties purchased the
same parcel of land. The plaintiffs purchased the parcel from
Native American landowners prior to the Revolutionary War,
and the defendants purchased the same land from the United
States after the conclusion of the peace treaty between the
United States and Great Britain.94
At issue in Johnson, was "the power of the Indians to give,
and of private individuals to receive, a title which can be sus-
tained in the Courts of this country." 95 Chief Justice Marshall
was therefore challenged with balancing the claims of a new,
fully recognized country against the rights of a native-but fal-
tering-race. 96 Consequently, Marshall had to take into account
the "'speculative' rights of the earlier European monarchs, the
'juridical' rights of their successor American states and the
'practical' economic and political demands of the millions who
now populated the continent." 97
Marshall premised his reasoning on the popular theory of the
time, that territories were originally "vacant." 98 Under this the-
ory, the Native Americans were now coming forward asking for
legal title to land that they had never owned. However, such a
request proved legally unattainable. Rather, Marshall advocated
that his hands were tied under the doctrine of "discovery,"
which consisted of the exclusive right to extinguish the Native
American's title to land through purchase or conquest. 99 Ap-
pealing to this doctrine, Marshall stated:
93 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
94 Though neither party before the court was Native American, the underly-
ing legal issue considered whether the Cherokee Nation had previously pos-
sessed the right to sell to a White American land it had "owned" prior to the
treaty's formation.
95 Id. at 572.
96 WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND/WHITE MAN'S LAW: THE
PAST AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 66-67 (1995).
97 Id.
98 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 594.
99 See Steve Newcomb, Five Hundred years of Injustice: The Legacy of Fif-
teenth Century Religious Practices, http://ili.nativeweb.org/sdrmart.html (last
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Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the con-
queror cannot deny, whatever the private and
speculative opinions of individuals may be re-
specting the original justice of the claim which has
successfully been asserted . . . it is not for the
Courts of this country to question the validity of
this title, or to sustain one which is incompatible
with it.100
Marshall further opined that Native Americans lacked uncon-
ditional sovereignty regardless of the centuries of relations con-
ducted in pursuit of treaties and diplomatic agreements. 10 1 Their
right to "complete sovereignty, as independent nations" was di-
minished or denied by "the original fundamental principle that
discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it,"102 which
was "excuse[d], if not justifi[ed], in the character and habits of
the people whose rights have been wrestled from them." 103 This
principle "was a right which all asserted to for themselves, and
to the assertion of which, by others, all assented." He further
dismissed rhetorical opposition, rationalizing that:
However extravagant the pretension of converting
the discovery of an inhabited country into con-
quest may appear, if the principle has been as-
serted in the first instance, and afterwards
sustained; if a country has been acquired and held
under it; if the property of the great mass of the
visited Jan. 15, 2015), note 5. "The doctrine of discovery [formulated in John-
son] stems from a papal document issued by Pope Nicholas V to King Al-
fonso VI in 1452, in which the Pope declared war against all non-Christians in
the world and specifically authorized and encouraged the conquest, coloniza-
tion, and exploitation of non-Christians and their territories. The edict in-
structed Christians to 'capture, vanquish, and subdue the saracens, pagans,
and other enemies of Christ,' to 'put them in perpetual slavery,' and 'to take
all their possessions and property."'
100 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 588.
101 Id.; Washburn, supra note 19, at 66.
102 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574 (emphasis added).
103 Id. at 589.
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community originates in it, it becomes the law of
the land and cannot be questioned. 04
Had Marshall applied common law and recognized the plain-
tiffs' ownership claim over the defendants', he would have legiti-
mized the equal rights of Native Americans to own and transfer
title in property. 05 Instead, Marshall held that the Native Amer-
ican tribes possessed qualified enforceable rights only to the soil
and the previous title of occupancy, rather than the disputed
land.10 6 It seems to have escaped Marshall that Native Ameri-
cans might actually have been first to assert this fundamental
principle of discovery. Thus, a problem with Marshall's reason-
ing is that it disregards the open risk of succession. Under Mar-
shall's rationale, any new "finder" could assert discovery over
the United States at any time.
Chief Justice Marshall's resentment for the Native Americans'
underlying claim to title could have been motivated by an antici-
pated outcome of what could happen to the lands of his country
should the Cherokee Nation prove successful in Court. 107 Mar-
shall's desire to protect the property rights of the conquerors
was sustained by his own economic self-interest in the contro-
versy as a landowner.10 8 The Cherokee Nation was, in effect,
104 Id. at 591.
105 Washburn, supra note 19, at 67.
106 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 594.
107 Marshall reasoned that the through treaties, "the Indian nations whose
title the plaintiffs claim.., has been ceded to the United States without any
reservation of [the Indians'] title. These nations had been at war with the
United States, and had an unquestionable right to annul any grant they had
made to the American citizens. . . They ceded to the United States this very
property, after having used it in common with other lands as their own, from
the date of their deeds to the time of cession, and the attempt now made, is
to set up their title against that of the United States." Id.
108 Marshall had been granted ownership to extensive acreage near the dis-
puted Illinois and Wabash tracts in the late 1700s. Whether Marshall still held
title to this specific land at the time of Johnson is unknown. See WALTER R.
ECHO-HAWK, IN THE COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR: THE 10 WORST INDIAN
LAW CASES EVER DECIDED 69-70 (2010).
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challenging his own title to land. In fact, Marshall had previ-
ously recused himself over a similar controversy for lack of im-
partiality, but Marshall's personal interests were not the only
interests at stake this time.10 9 By this standard, most judges, who
also were privileged White Americans, also would consequently
have been deemed unqualified to perform these legal duties.
Equally likely is that Marshall realized a decision in favor of the
plaintiff's rights would substantially undermine the Supreme
Court's authority and risk censure by other branches of the
government."l0
The Johnson opinion served to formally define Native Ameri-
can rights as well as how "Indians" fit into the American com-
munity." The opinion explained that, ordinarily, a conquered
group is assimilated into the triumphant nation and, conse-
quently, becomes subjects or citizens of the new government-
thus, the rights of the conquered to their property should remain
unimpaired.1 2 However, in this case, such a policy was impossi-
ble because "the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were
fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsis-
109 Marshall recused himself in a similar case, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, just
seven years prior. There too, two landowners claimed title to the same land:
the British plaintiff, Martin, claimed title by inheritance to land that Virginia
claimed it had seized during the Revolution, and subsequently sold to the
defendant, Hunter, a Virginia citizen. Though the case is widely regarded for
its assertion of Supreme Court authority over State courts in matters of Fed-
eral law, Marshall recused himself, citing a financial conflict of interest. Mar-
shall and his brother had signed a contract with Martin to purchase the land
in dispute. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
1o In fact, just one year after the previously mentioned Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall determined that the Cherokees were a recog-
nizable nation under a U.S. Treaty, and repudiated Georgia's Claims over
Cherokee lands-effectively narrowing the doctrine of discovery. Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556-57 (1832). In response to this, Jackson
remarked "John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it."
Edwin A. Miles, After John Marshall's Decision: Worcester v. Georgia and the
Nullification Crisis, 39 J. OF S. HIST. 4, 519-44 (1973).
1l1 Washburn, supra note 92, at 67.
112 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 589.
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tence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in pos-
session of their country was to leave the country a
wilderness."' 13
Like many opinions of the time, Marshall's negative emotions
toward Native Americans were sustained by the claim that it
was "impossible to mix" with the indigenous peoples in order to
achieve a common society.114 Nor could they be permitted to
retain exclusive control over their territories, as these "savages"
were merely "perpetual inhabitants with diminutive rights. '' 15
Since coexistence was impossible, transferring title by the fiction
of discovery was the only option-and the outcome of Johnson
was not only warranted, but also justified.
Not surprisingly, Marshall is not the only Supreme Court Jus-
tice to have relied on the sympathies of his culture for justifica-
tion. More than a century later, in 1955, after oral arguments
regarding exclusivity tribal land in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v.
United States, Justice Reed wrote to Justice Douglas that "a mo-
nopoly of a three million dollar year fishery" was "too much to
give the Indians."116 Justice Reed held the Native American
right of occupancy is "not a property right" or subject to just
compensation upon termination.117 Instead, he defined occu-
pancy by "permission of the whites to occupy."" 8 In 1981, a tri-
bal restriction on non-Indian hunting and fishing came before
the Court in Montana v. United States. The Crow Tribe argued a
treaty concluded in 1868 vested it with regulatory powers over
wildlife conservation, which was essential to the subsistence
113 Id. at 590.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 569.
116 See Joseph William Singer, Erasing Indian Country: The Story of Tee-Hit-
Ton Indians v. U.S., in INDIAN LAW STORIES 229, 240 (Carole Goldberg et al.
eds. 2010) (quoting WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939-1975:
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 21 (1980)).
117 See Echo-Hawk, supra note 108, at 78; Tee-Hit-Ton v. United States, 348
U.S. 272, 279 (1955).
118 Id.
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economy of a growing reservation population, and for which it
presented substantial empirical evidence in support. 119 There,
Justice White, an avid fly-fisherman in Montana, played an in-
strumental role of challenging the tribal claim during oral argu-
ments. 120 With only two Justices dissenting, the Supreme Court
declared the Crow Tribe had no authority to regulate hunting
and fishing access to certain reservation lands by non-mem-
bers,121 and ended its discussion by suggesting it might have
found for the tribe if fishing had been important enough to them
since "at the time of the treaty the Crows were a nomadic tribe
dependent on buffalo, and fishing was not important to their
diet or way of life."1 22 Such rhetoric masks resentment to a pos-
sible outcome divesting valuable government land and natural
resources from those claiming superior title to the property,
property which had once "legally" been secured by conquest.
Moreover, in United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, Chief
Justice Rehnquist authored a dissent denying any wrongdoing
committed by the government against the Sioux Nation, and in-
stead relied on his own views of history and Manifest Destiny123
Prior to U.S. v. Sioux, Congress had passed a law allowing Na-
tive Americans to relitigate previous claims in hopes of rectify-
ing prior unjust land disputes. 24 As a result, the Sioux brought
suit to litigate their due process rights impinged upon in the
1870s. The Supreme Court reviewed the distressing account of
the government's acquisition of the Black Hills upon the Sioux's
military defeat and confinement to a reservation after the Great
Sioux War of 1876-77.125 Hard evidence exposed that the Sioux
119 See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 556 (1981).
120 John P. LaVelle, Beating a Path of Retreat from Treaty Rights and Tribal
Sovereignty: The Story of Montana v. United States, in INDIAN LAW STORIES
535-90 (Carole Goldberg et al. eds. 2010).
121 Washburn, supra note 19.
122 Montana, 450 U.S. at 554.
123 Echo-Hawk, supra note 108, at 33.
124 Id.; United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
125 Echo-Hawk, supra note 108.
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had been living under starving conditions and were driven to
"sell" the Black Hills in exchange for government food ra-
tions.12 6 The Supreme Court held that in such circumstances, ra-
tions alone could not constitute adequate payment for the
territory and required the Government to provide retroactive
fair compensation.12 7 However, Chief Justice Rehnquist de-
clared it unfair to judge facts "by the light of 'revisionist' histori-
ans or the mores of another era." 28 Instead, Rehnquist inserted
into the dissent his own recitation of the facts, based upon the
Court of Claims' factual interpretation of the events in 1877. By
Rehnquist's account, "the record shows that the action taken
was pursuant to a policy which the Congress deemed to be for
the interest of the Indians and just to both parties."129
Paving the way for decades of similar precedent, Johnson v.
M'Intosh sanctioned conquest and discovery as justifying the
United States' legal authority over Native Americans and the
use of their lands. The opinion secured "respectable" and de-
fendable principles of "the inferior status of Indian property
rights ... the allegedly inferior cultural standing of tribes, the
impaired ability of tribes to sell their incomplete title," and set-
tled the qualified political status of tribes.130 Marshall premised
his reasoning on the legal fiction of discovery and its fundamen-
tal importance to the United States. His decision established a
holding that has had lasting implications for indigenous rela-
tions,131 and remains the basis of law for federal dispossession.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.; Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 425, (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 426, (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
130 Marshall's opinion on the legitimacy of the conveyances made it clear
that "the discovery of the Indian-occupied lands of this nation vested abso-
lute title in the discoverers, and rendered the Indian inhabitants themselves
incapable of transferring absolute title to others." See J. CRIBBET, ET AL.,
PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 1996).
131 Even today, Native American tribes must be federally recognized in or-
der to receive protections afforded to tribes by law. See NATIVE AMERICAN
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Early Federal Indian Law failed to contemplate whether it
might be unfair, let alone unnecessary, to expect Native Ameri-
cans to entirely assimilate and set aside any loyalties to prac-
ticed centuries of their own cultural identities.132 Rather, courts
continuously promoted the notion that prevailing social values
required Native Americans to adopt the national identity of
their new conquerors-something, however, which had been le-
gally determined to be impossible. Since coexistence could not
be achieved, entitlement to the land vested in White Americans.
Such outcomes were also well-received and desired by other
governmental bodies, which, consequently, served to reinforce
the Court's authority In theory and in practice, foundational
Federal Indian Law was sustained by the emotion of resentment
to the Native Americans by their White American conquerors.
As a product of its time, this resentment materialized in judicial
rhetoric, which has reinforced a long history of conquest, reloca-
tion and usurpation of a people. Such foundational precedent
continues to deprive Native Americans of the right to control
their culture and identity.133
Loyalty: Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protection Ass'n, (1988)
Loyalty to one's convictions or group can inhibit the capacity
to experience perspective and empathy. In the context of relig-
ion, loyalty becomes especially instrumental to the practice of
faith. However, the United States' historical record toward Na-
tive American religious practices cuts sharply against the na-
GRAVES PROTECTION AND REPATRIATION ACT, 25 U.S.C. § 3001; see also
Bonnichen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004).
132 See ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE 208 (2004).
133 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (The Court
refused to let tribal courts try White Americans for crimes committed on
Native American reservations. Justice Rehnquist explained tribal courts are
not really a part of the American judicial system, because tribes lost their
sovereignty and gave up "their power to try non-Indian citizens.").
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tion's image as a proponent of religious freedom. Even today,
legal conflicts arise involving the complex nature of indigenous
religious practices in regards to the ceremonial use of protected
endangered species,' T3 consumption of peyote 135 and access to
historically religious sites.136
Arguably, the most famous political act taken against Native
Americans in their exercise of religion occurred during the
Ghost Dance and massacre at Wounded Knee Creek, South Da-
kota, in late December of 1890. The Ghost Dancers believed the
earth would be wiped out during a cataclysmic earthquake in
which only the dancing believers would be spared.137 Fearing
that the ceremony would lead to an uprising, Federal agents
banned the Ghost Dance and proclaimed it a threat. 138 The Na-
tives ignored the order and began dancing. U.S. troops re-
sponded by using rapid-firing Hotchkiss guns to massacre 256
Sioux Indians. 139 A Sioux survivor recounted the tragedy:
Dead and wounded Indian women and children
and little babies were scattered all along where
they had been trying to run away. The soldiers had
followed along the gulch, as they ran, and mur-
dered them in there. Sometimes they were in
heaps because they had huddled together and
some were scattered all along. Sometimes bunches
of them had been killed and torn to pieces where
the wagon guns hit them. I saw a little baby try to
suck its mother, but she was bloody and dead.140
134 See Zoe Robinson, Rationalizing Religious Exemptions: A Legislative
Process Theory of Statutory Exemptions for Religion, 20 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 133, 162 (2011).
135 See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
136 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1980).
137 David V. Baker, American Indian Executions in Historical Context, 4
CRIM. JUST. STUDIES 343 (2007).
138 Id. at 344.
139 Id.
140 ARRELL GIBSON, THE AMERICAN INDIAN: PREHISTORY TO THE PRESENT
479 (1980).
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After the incident, the Federal Government awarded 20 Con-
gressional Medals of Honor to the soldiers that fired upon the
dancing Native Americans at Wounded Knee, including the
soldiers who operated the four Hotchkiss machine guns.14 1
Though the Wounded Knee massacre might be the most famous
of such events, other repeated denials of access to religious free-
dom and failures to accept the various forms of Native Ameri-
cans' religious culture precipitated centuries of religious
injustices.
In an effort to remedy these injustices, in 1978, Congress en-
acted the American Indian Religious Freedom Act to protect
and preserve Native American religious cultural rights and prac-
tices. The Act states:
Henceforth it shall be the policy of the United
States to protect and to preserve for American In-
dians their inherent right of freedom to believe,
express, and exercise the traditional religions of
the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native
Hawaiians, including but not limited to access to
sacred sites, use and possession of sacred objects
and freedom to worship through ceremonials and
traditional rites.142
Congress's Act required policies of all governmental agencies
to eliminate interference with the free exercise of Native reli-
141 W. Wylie, Jr., Land of the Free? Shaping of Today's Culture in the United
States (1850-1859), available at http://members.aol.com/wdwylie6/1850-1859
.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2013), in Baker, supra note 137, at 344. By con-
trast, courts regularly convicted Native American for killings committed dur-
ing warfare, which are not usually defined as crimes of murder. In the
aftermath of the Dakota-Sioux uprising in 1862, Federal officers executed 39
Native Americans for convictions of civilian crimes of murder, accessory to
murder, and kidnapping, rather than trying the Native Americans for viola-
tions of customary rules on warfare. See Carol Chomsky, The United States-
Dakota War Trials: A Study of Military Injustice 43 STAN. L. REV 13-96
(1990).
142 AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92
Stat. 459 (1978).
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gions based on the First Amendment, and to accommodate ac-
cess to, and use of, religious sites to the extent that the use was
practicable and not inconsistent with an agency's essential func-
tions.143 It also acknowledged the prior violation of that right.
While the Act seemed to promise religious accommodation and
legal acknowledgment of religious freedom, its interpretation in
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association re-
vealed the disappointing reality.
At issue in Lyng was whether the Free Exercise Clause pro-
hibited the Government from harvesting timber and construct-
ing a road through a portion of the Chimney Rock area of the
Six Rivers National Forest.144 The Yurok, Karok and Tolowa
tribes145 used the proposed site for religious rituals. These rituals
required "privacy, silence, and an undisturbed natural set-
ting."146 A study completed in 1979 had concluded such a road
"would cause serious and irreparable damage to the sacred ar-
eas which are an integral and necessary part of the belief sys-
tems and lifeway of Northwest California Indian peoples."147
But the Forest Service decided to build the road anyway. Ac-
cordingly, the California District Court issued, and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed, an injunction holding that the First Amend-
ment prohibited the Government's construction of the road. 48
Though Justice O'Connor's language is much more neutral
than the language of her predecessors, it inherently communi-
cates a loyal effort to hold on to colonially established beliefs
143 Id.
144 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. at 441.
145 The three tribes lived on the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation, which
adjoined the Six Rivers National Forest and the Chimney Rock area that had
historically been used for their religious purposes. Id. at 442.
146 Id.
147 Writing for the majority opinion, O'Connor acknowledged other evi-
dence finding that alternative routes avoiding the Chimney Rock area alto-
gether would have required acquisition of private land with serious stability
problems. However, the holding was based on a finding that no cognizable
burden existed on the tribes' religious practice. Id.
148 Id. at 444.
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and precedent that satisfy current goals in society. Christianity
deems land and location irrelevant to the practice of its faith,
which occurs in a church. Thus it becomes hard to imagine how
a specific parcel of land could control the existence of a religion
from a Christian perspective. As part of their strategy in the
District Court, the plaintiffs appealed to the Christian values of
church. On the first day of trial, a young Native American took
the stand, explaining, "[t]he High Country was placed there by
the creator as a place where Indian people could seek religious
power . . . This area is our church: [it] cannot be moved or dis-
turbed in anyway." He continued, "any adverse changes in the
High Country will have a direct impact on the practice of our
religious beliefs," which constituted "the very core of our cul-
tur[al] identity.''149
Yet, the majority did not agree. The opinion 150 specifically dis-
tinguished Lyng from cases with White American plaintiffs
brought under similar, but Christian, concerns. 151 And though
Congress explicitly intended that the Native American practices
receive religious protections, the majority found a way to side
step the American Indian Religious Freedom Act and the First
Amendment entirely. To justify a burden on religion under the
Free Exercise Clause, the Government's objective needed to
present a compelling interest that was narrowly tailored to
achieve its purpose: in this case, to harvest and haul timber
under a management plan adopted by the Government itself.1 52
Yet, the Court preempted justification and held federal manage-
149 Amy Bowers and Kristen Carpenter, Challenging the Narrative of Con-
quest. The Story of Lyng v. Northwest Indian, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 489,
510 (Carole Goldberg et al. eds. 2010) (quoting Joint Appendix to the Peti-
tion for a Writ of Certiorari at 370-72, Lyng, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (No. 86-
1013)).
150 Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justices White, Stevens, and Scalia joined. Justice Kennedy took no part
in consideration or decision of the case. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 441.
151 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450.
152 Id. This test has now been supplanted by Employment Division v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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ment of public lands imposed no burden on the Native Ameri-
cans' practice of religion whatsoever.I5 3Citing the Court's prior
rejection of a Native American religious claim in Bowen v.
Roy, 154 O'Connor explained, "[t]he Free Exercise Clause affords
an individual protection from certain forms of governmental
compulsion; it does not afford an individual a right to dictate the
conduct of the Government's internal procedures."
In doing so, Justice O'Connor analogized the aggregate relig-
ious burdens of three separate Native American tribes with that
of one couple personally concerned with the adverse affect that
a Social Security number would have on their child's soul.155 The
majority rejected the tribes' distinction between the subjective
parents' desire and the present objective circumstances in which
the road would physically destroy the environmental conditions
and the essential privacy, without which the religious practices
could not be conducted. 56 During oral arguments, the Tribes'
counsel spent most of her time responding to numerous factual
hypotheticals regarding the limits of the religious practice-spe-
cifically, whether the tribes also sought to prevent "Boy Scout
encampments" or Forest Service Rangers from conducting "fire
protection. '"157 The Court could not empathize with the practice
of a religion so ancient and unfamiliar in order to recognize the
adverse and permanent effects of an industrial logging road as
different from the trivial disturbances of potential campers. Nor
could it perceive the inherent similarities between the Natives'
religious claim and prior claims brought under Judeo-Christian
concerns.
153 Id. at 476.
154 Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (The plaintiff parents contended relig-
ious beliefs prevented them from acceding to the use of a Social Security
number for their 2-year-old daughter because the use of a numerical identi-
fier would "'rob the spirit' of [their] daughter and prevent her from attaining
greater spiritual power").
155 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 448.
156 Id. at 449.
157 Bowers and Carpenter, supra note 54, at 521.
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Instead, O'Connor found the tribes' efforts to distinguish Roy
"unavailing," calling any effects the lawful road would have on
the Natives' religious beliefs, merely "incidental."' 58 The major-
ity went on to distinguish the tribes' complaint from other Free
Exercise challenges that resulted in a substantial burden on a
Judeo-Christian religion. In Yoder, the challenged compulsory
school attendance state law-the criminal violation of which
subjected a parent to a $5 fine-had threatened to undermine
the Amish community and religious practices. To avoid violating
that law, adherents would be forced to "abandon belief ... or
• ..to migrate to some other and more tolerant religion.' 159
Considering that even if the Court were to accept that the Gov-
ernment's project could "virtually destroy . . . Indians' ability to
practice their religion," Justice O'Connor nonetheless found the
Constitution "simply does not provide a principle that could jus-
tify upholding [the tribes'] religious claims. "160 This was because
the "Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to re-
quire the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways
that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens.' 16 1
In essence, the majority's opinion argued that the "government
simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every citi-
zen's religious needs and desires." Despite O'Connor's use and
repetition of "simply," the road's repercussions on the indige-
nous religious rituals were not simple at all.
Relying on the fact that the road would be removed from the
religious sites by a half mile, Justice O'Connor rationalized the
intrusion saying, "[n]o sites where specific rituals take place
were to be disturbed."1 62 The majority further justified the in-
158 Id.
159 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (The Amish were criminally
fined $5 for failing to provide traditional education to their children after the
8th grade. The criminal nature of the statute was problematic as adherence
was coercive in nature).
160 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451-52.
161 Id. at 448.
162 Id. at 453.
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junction's reversal under a concern for hypothetical future suits
brought by Native Americans seeking to exclude all human ac-
tivity from all religious areas. 163 Justice O'Connor concluded
saying, "[e]xcept for abandoning its project entirely, and thereby
leaving the two existing segments of road to dead-end in the
middle of a National Forest, it is difficult to see how the Govern-
ment could have been more solicitous."164
Denial and loyalty is demonstrated by the majority's refusal
to accept that injustices occurred in the original divestment of
the Native Americans' land. Its tone further discloses a rejection
of the tribes' religion as legitimate. Not only does the rhetoric
display a refusal to recognize previous religious injustices, but it
also demonstrates loyalty to a religious belief on which this
country was founded. To illustrate, the majority states:
The Constitution does not permit government to
discriminate against religions that treat particular
physical sites as sacred, and a law prohibiting In-
dian respondents from visiting the Chimney Rock
area would raise a different set of constitutional
questions. Whatever rights the Indians may have to
the use of the area, however, those rights do not
divest the Government of its right to use what is,
after all, its land.165
How the majority failed to realize the irony of that statement
is unclear. Nor does it explain why the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed an issue that both lower courts had de-
cided in favor of the Native Americans. The lower courts held
and affirmed that "the proposed logging and construction activi-
ties will destroy respondents' religion, and will therefore neces-
sarily force them into abandoning those practices altogether.' '166
No circuit splits on the issue or other similar motivations for
163 Id. at 452.
164 Id.
165 Id. (emphasis added).
166 Id. at 467.
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exercising review were present. To the contrary, Congress
passed an Act explicitly requiring the accommodation these re-
ligious practices.167 Yet, the Supreme Court heard, and reversed,
a case questioning the Government's right to use its own land
even if it infringed upon Native American religious practices-a
case which should not have proceeded to court, given express
Congressional intent on the matter. 168
In the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor distinctly refers to
the indigenous tribes as "Indians." To call them anything else
would have undercut the ownership and usage rights of the land.
Imagine the previously italicized provision using "Indians" re-
placed by any of the following phrases: "Native Americans,"
"indigenous peoples of America," or more specifically, "those
who inhabited this land centuries before we eventually arrived
and took it by force":
Whatever rights the [insert preferred phrase] may
have to the use of the area, however, those rights do
not divest the Government of its right to use what
is, after all, its land.
Inherent in each combination lies the information that Native
Americans are the original inhabitants of the North American
continent.169 Thus, it seems the majority's motivations for con-
167 AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT, supra note 142.
168 The Supreme Court had recently stuck down another Congressional ef-
fort to devise legislation consolidating Native American lands back to tribal
communities, and did so again just a few years later. See Angela R. Riley,
The Apex of Congress' Plenary power over Indian Affairs: The Story of Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 189, 228 (Carole Goldberg et al.
eds. 2010).
169 Compare this language to Justice Brennan's rhetoric in the dissent. Writ-
ing for Justices Marshall and Blackmun, Justice Brennan expressed frustra-
tion finding the conflicting concerns regarding use and exclusion of activity of
the land represented, "yet another stress point in the longstanding conflict
between two disparate cultures - the dominant Western culture, which views
land in terms of ownership and use, and that of Native Americans, in which
concepts of private property are not only alien, but contrary to a belief sys-
tem that hold lands sacred." In further contrast to the majority's rhetoric,
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sistently using an alternative term and rejecting this view are
based upon a loyalty to its own culture and patriotic vision,
which associates the European groups who ejected the Native
Americans from their land with "America," rather than with the
persons who first inhabited America.170
The Supreme Court's decision can be understood as a materi-
alization of the dominant, cultural majority's continued subjuga-
tion, both spiritually and culturally, of Native Americans. The
majority used discourse as persuasion in an effort to justify its
legal judgment, which effectually eliminated a centuries-old re-
ligion. The Lyng decision served several "loyal" purposes: it ex-
hibited a loyalty to the historical establishment of our country; it
showed loyalty to the decision in Johnson transferring all titles
of land to the U.S. government; it proved loyal to the original
views discouraging recognition of Native American rights and
legitimate religious practice; and, most importantly, the opinion
maintained its loyalty to envisioned values of its own culture,
religion and patriotic vision of this country. This loyalty in Lyng
Justice Brennan consistently refers to the tribes as "Native Americans," a
term more accurate to their description of origin.
170 During oral arguments, the following exchange occurred between Justice
Brennan and the Government's counsel:
Justice Brennan: Is there anything in the record to show how long the Indi-
ans have been using the land?
Mr. Pincus: There is testimony in the record indicating the use is quite...
has been quite long, but Your Honor, I think-
Justice Brennan: Weren't they using it before we arrived?
Mr. Pincus: I don't think that the record evidence goes back that long,
Your Honor. I'm not sure. It certainly goes back to the 1800s.
Justice Brennan: It could be so, couldn't it?
Mr. Pincus: It certainly could be, but let me say that any rule that makes
the protections of the free exercise clause depend on how long a religion has
been in existence is the very type of government preference for religion re-
ally that the clause is specifically designed to prevent. It would elevate tradi-
tional religion over a new religion and give it more protection against
government action.
However, herein lies the bias: the Native Americans were not asking for
superior rights of religion. They merely requested same rights afforded to
others under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
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demonstrates how our legal system still preserves fictions of law
to the detriment of Native Americans.171
Even today, controversy continues to surround the land on
which the Wounded Knee massacre occurred. In the late 1800s,
the Wounded Knee site passed into private hands through gov-
ernment allotment to non-Native Americans. The current pri-
vate owner of the Wounded Knee site, who has held title to the
40-acre plot since 1968, wants to sell and is asking $3.9 million
for the property valued at $14,000 by the county assessor. 172 He
offered the Oglala Sioux the opportunity to purchase under
right of first refusal by May 1, 2013. However, the Oglala tribe
of the Pine Indian Reservation maintains one of the highest
poverty rates in the United States. 73 The owner has been con-
sidering offers from private developers as well as the possibility
of public auction.
In March of 2012, President Obama authorized the purchase
of five parcels of land around the country to be designated and
preserved as national monuments, including one in Maryland
honoring Harriet Tubman and the Underground Railroad. 174
Two others honor Charles Young, an African American soldier
171 The Lyng decision was extremely controversial and provoked an outcry
of social responses from both religious organizations and environmentalists.
As a result, the road was never built; regardless, the decision's legal implica-
tions on Native American religion will remain law until it is overturned.
172 In an ironic twist, the owner, James Czywczynski, claims no restitution
was ever made for the seizure of his trading post, home, and vehicles for 71
days during the infamous American Indian Movement occupation of 1973.
For this reason alone, he has set the asking price at almost four million dol-
lars for the Oglala Sioux tribe, in effect, holding the land hostage. Mark Jo-
hanson, Wounded Knee for Sale: Should Oglala Sioux pay $3.9M to Save
Massacre Site From Developers? INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES, http://
www.ibtimes.com/wounded-knee-sale-should-oglala-sioux-pay-39m-save-mas
sacre-site-developers-1224999 (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).
173 Joseph Brings Plenty, Save Wounded Knee, NEW YORK TIMES (April 11,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/12/opinion/save-wounded-knee.html?
smid=fb-share&_r=2& (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).
174 THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, PRESIDENT
OBAMA DESIGNATES FIVE NEW NATIONAL MONUMENTS (March 25, 2013),
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of the United States Army who acted as superintendent over the
Sequoia and General Grant National Parks, and established a
monument in Delaware to commemorate the English settlement
of the first state's colony, 75 but the purchase of Wounded Knee
was not considered. The United States acknowledges and makes
legitimate efforts to pay tribute to the wrongs committed against
minorities; however, more can, and should, be done to right the
wrongs suffered by Native Americans.
Legislative developments echo this climate of neglect. In
2000, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institution-
alized Persons Act protecting religious sites of worship and de-
fining "religious exercise" as "any exercise of religion, whether
or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious be-
lief." 76 The Act extends broad religious protections to incarcer-
ated individuals, who have had their religious rights severely
burdened through the government's act of incarceration, and to
those who maintain "an ownership, leasehold, easement, servi-
tude, or other property interest in the regulated land."'177 How-
ever, nothing in the Act addresses the unique circumstances of
Native American religious practices on holy, but federally
owned, land. Until the legal system adequately reflects a system
that accommodates Native practices-let alone acknowledges
and accepts accountability for injustices committed against Na-
tives-the emotion of loyalty will continue to finance well-rea-
soned justifications that sustain the cultural majority's preferred
version of history. Loyalty as a psychological mechanism will
continue to shape society and endorse falsehoods in history until
society collectively accepts certain troublesome facts as true and
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/25/president-obama-des
ignates-five-new-national-monuments.
175 Id.
176 RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS AcT
(RLUPIA) of 2000, Pub. L. 106-174, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5 "Definitions" et
seq.
177 Id.; Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
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1)5 PATRIOTIC RACISM
takes the necessary steps to prevent future mischaracterizations
and injustices.
Shame: State v. Williams (Wash. Ct. App. 1971)
As previously discussed, this paper proposes that shame can
be the most powerful, and perhaps the most useful, emotion oc-
curring within the context of racism. Shame is both an internal
and external emotion: it can be personally experienced or it can
be imposed upon another, and recognition of one's own shame
can signify an acceptance of personal responsibility, becoming a
catalyst for progressive change.
This psychological dynamic can be seen through progressive
social efforts taken to remedy White Americans' prior subjuga-
tion of African Americans, but such levels of "shame" have not
yet evolved within the context of the Native American race.
Thus, the absence of shame becomes particularly relevant in a
justice system holding Native Americans to the legal standard of
one culture, when it has historically designated them as inferior.
Repercussions of such disparate treatment continue to place Na-
tive Americans in the specific circumstances for which they ap-
pear before the court-a system that fails to accept social
responsibility or permit those circumstances to mitigate the
court's considerations. As illustrated below, this denial is espe-
cially relevant in a court's objective consideration of "the rea-
sonable man" in criminal law.
In the late 1970s, the Washington legal system subjected two
disadvantaged Native American parents to that reasonable man
standard. Walter and Bernice Williams could be the only par-
ents ever to have been convicted for the involuntary manslaugh-
ter of their child where a court has deemed it necessary to
record a legal finding of parental love and ignorance. Despite
recognizing the fact the Williamses had not realized their son's
life was in danger, the court convicted the parents of allowing
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their fourteen-month-old son die of pneumonia.17 s The opinion
in State v. Williams is rich with emotion, both within the court's
legal finding of "love" and its rationalization of the Williamses'
"willful" indifference. 179 Even on appeal, these emotions were
recited and affirmed by the reviewing court.
The court described Walter Williams as a "24-year-old full-
blooded Sheshont Indian with a sixth-grade education," who
worked as a laborer.1s 0 Walter was the child's stepfather. His
mother, Bernice Williams, was described as a "20-year-old part
Indian with an 11th grade education." 181 In the fall of 1968, Wal-
ter and Bernice's son became ill.
To alleviate their son's pain, the Williamses gave him aspirin,
believing that was what was required, until it became too late.182
In reality, the child was suffering from "an abscessed tooth,"
which "develop[ed] into an infection of the mouth and cheeks,
eventually becoming gangrenous." 83 The infection produced an
odor, and the child's check "turned a bluish color."184 Unable to
eat, the boy became malnourished and eventually died of pneu-
monia. Expert testimony revealed that the child would have sur-
vived had he received adequate care at least one week before
his death.185 Despite this, the trial court expressly made a find-
178 State v. Williams, 484 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
179 In the opinion, the Court of Appeals held evidence sufficient to sustain
finding that the parents, who were "ignorant," loved their child, fed their
child aspirin, and believed the child was suffering from a simple toothache,
had been put on notice concerning the symptoms of their child's true illness.
Thus, the lack of improvement in the baby's apparent condition during a pe-
riod when medical attention could have saved the baby's life constituted neg-
ligence, which sustained their conviction for involuntary manslaughter.
180 Williams, 484 P.2d at 1169.
181 Id. at 1174.
182 Id. at 1173.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 1173-74.
185 Id.
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ing that the Williamses "did not realize how sick the baby
was."
186
Believing the child was suffering from a painful toothache,
Walter testified that, given "the way the cheek looked,... and
that stuff on his hair, [the welfare authorities] would think we
were neglecting him and take him away from us and not give
him back."' 87 Bernice shared Walter's fear and rightfully so. In
the 1970s, welfare authorities were quick to remove Native
American children from their families and place them with non-
Native families.188 At the time of State v. Williams, one in four
Native American children were separated from their parents
and placed with non-Native families, foster homes, or in other
environments.189 Both of the Williamses were well aware of this
probability.
Whether criminal courts were aware of this statistic is un-
clear.' 90 Yet, the opinion's rhetoric seems to convey shame:
shame for the unfortunate circumstances, shame for the social
situation of the parents, and shame at the loss of a child. De-
fined as a painful emotion caused by consciousness of guilt,
shortcoming or impropriety, shame has been characterized as a
response to a realization that a desired outcome is unattainable:
in this case, going back in time to remedy a number of regretta-
ble events. 191 Accordingly, using such dry legal language to dis-
cuss the parental emotion of love, when such a finding was not
required in a manslaughter case, may have been a recognition of
the unique circumstances involved:
The defendant husband assumed parental respon-
sibility with the defendant wife to provide cloth-
186 Id. at 1170.
187 Id. at 1174.
188 ECHO-HAWK, supra note 108, at 217.
189 Id.
190 Placement cases would have occurred in family court, rather than in
criminal.
191 See Part II of this article titled "Shame," supra notes 80-91.
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ing, care and medical attention for the child. Both
defendants possessed a great deal of love and af-
fection for the defendant wife's young son. 192
Despite their love for their son, the Williamses' failure to real-
ize his life was in danger when a "man of reasonable prudence
under the same or similar conditions" would have realized the
risk, coupled with their failure to take the baby to the doctor
when they were obligated to do so, culminated in involuntary
manslaughter. As the lower court stated, and the appellate court
affirmed:
The defendants were ignorant. They did not real-
ize how sick the baby was. They thought that the
baby had a toothache and no layman regards a
toothache as dangerous to life. They loved the
baby and gave it aspirin in hopes of improving its
condition. They did not take the baby to a doctor
because of fear that the Welfare Department
would take the baby away from them. They knew
that medical help was available because of previ-
ous experience. They had no excuse that the law
will recognize for not taking the baby to a
doctor. 193
Interestingly, the Washington Court of Appeals conducted its
own factual examination of the evidence in determining whether
"willful misconduct" existed to support the lack of excuse for
failing to seek medical attention: "[t]he conclusion, in light of
the findings, means merely that the conduct, although not inten-
tional, was without lawful excuse and therefore willful ... De-
fendants willfully violated the duty owing their deceased child."
To justify conducting its own factual consideration, the appellate
court wrote, "[b]ecause of the serious nature of the charge
against the parent and step-parent of a well-loved child, and out
192 Williams, 484 P.2d at 1170.
193 Id.
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of our concern for the constitutional rights of the defendants, we
have made an independent examination of the evidence..."
This interpretation relied on an evaluation of "ordinary cau-
tion" compared to gross negligence, defining ordinary caution as
the "kind of caution that a man of reasonable prudence would
exercise under same or similar conditions." 194 Yet, in a legal sys-
tem that has continually placed Native Americans at a disadvan-
tage, by denying their constitutional rights, by restricting the
practices of their culture, and by holding them accountable for
the products of these unjust impositions, what "conditions"
should, in fact, be considered? A long history of legally author-
ized injustices placed the Williamses in their unique position,
and, at the time of the case, the State practiced the frequent
removal of Reservation children from their families. The opin-
ion even indicates that Bernice recognized this threat, testifying,
"[i]t's just that I was so scared of losing him."'' 95
The practiced habit of Native children removal became so
common that by 1978, Congress declared an "Indian child wel-
fare crisis of massive portions."19 6 To counter this crisis, Con-
gress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, requiring
state courts to apply Native American cultural values as mini-
mum standards during placement and transfer cases to tribal
courts upon request., 97 Congress took action to investigate
causes and intervened to protect Native American families and
tribes and their cultural integrity.' 98 Government agents had
been removing children from reservations for almost an entire
century, placing them into state run assimilation programs. 199 As
part of those programs, children were sent to Federal boarding
194 Id.
195 Id. at 1174.
196 ECHO-HAWK, supra note 108, at 217-20.
197 Id. at 219; INDIAN CHILD WELFARE Acr OF 1978, Pub. L. 95-608 (Nov. 8,
1978), 92 Stat. 3069, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963.
198 ECHO-HAWK, supra note 108, at 218.
199 Id.
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schools, often hundreds of miles away from their tribes.200 Pa-
rental suits were often unsuccessful; some courts upheld govern-
ment custody of Indian children, even when the custody was
against the parents' wishes.20 1
Under the United Nations definition, such acts constituted ge-
nocide. The UN defines genocide as an act "committed with in-
tent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or
religious group," such as "[f]orcibly transferring children of the
group to another group."2 2 The 1978 House report showed that
34,538 Native American children were living in institutional set-
tings in 74 boarding schools apart from their families.23 Con-
gress blamed the State systems and courts for creating this crisis,
stating, "[t]he wholesale separation of Indian children from their
families is perhaps the most tragic and destructive aspect of
American Indian life today." Much of that blame was then
transferred to non-Native American social workers, who were
unfamiliar with Native cultures, and their misunderstanding of
the Native nuclear family and social structures on reserva-
tions.204 In addition, the agents' uninformed assessment of such
family structures rendered it nearly impossible for other Native
American couples to qualify as foster or adoptive parents for
displaced Native children.2 5
The legal system placed families, like the Williamses, between
a rock and a hard place. Taking the baby to the doctor may have
saved the Williams child's life, but doing so was weighed against
200 Id. at 221.
201 Id.; see In re Can-ah-couqua, 29 F. 687 (D. Alaska 1887).
202 See ECHO-HAWK, supra note 108, at 221; ART. 2 (2), CONVENTION ON
THE PREVENTION OF AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE, UN
GEN. ASSEMBLY RES. 260 (III) (approved Dec. 9, 1948, available at http.hr
web.org/legal/genocide.html.
203 Id.; HOUSE REPORT No. 1386 ON H.R. 12533, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS. (July
24, 1978), p.9; see also Manuel P. Guerrero, Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978:
A Response to the Threat to Indian Culture Caused by Foster and Adoptive
Placements of Indian Children, 7 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 51, 52 (1979).
204 ECHO-HAWK, supra note 108, at 222-23.
205 Id.
Volume 8, Number 1
1+t0DePaul Journal for Social Justice
Winter 201+
50
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 6
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol8/iss1/6
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what the Williamses believed was a guarantee that their son
would be taken away. And, had the baby been removed and
placed in a foster home, it is unlikely the Williamses could have
successfully sought redress in court. Thus, courts held Native
Americans, like the Williamses, accountable for the mistakes
they made in fear of losing their children to the White American
welfare system: a risk they weighed more inevitable, but just as
permanent, as death.
This absence of shame when evaluating a Native American
under the standards of a "reasonable" White American has
echoed throughout criminal law.2 6 However, some instances ex-
ist in which the law has more recently taken cultural considera-
tions into account. Patrick Croy, a Native American from
northern California, was raised in an area that suffered from dis-
crimination due to long-standing conflict with White Ameri-
cans. 207 As a result, he grew up distrusting white authorities.208
When Patrick and two friends became involved in a dispute over
change in a liquor store, "twenty-seven police officers re-
sponded in pursuit of the three men." 20 9 During his retreat, Pat-
206 For Native Americans, the ruinous consequences of an oppressive justice
system continue to materialize in recent history. In 1982, the National Minor-
ity Advisory Council on Criminal Justice pointed out that "[tihe discrimina-
tory law enforcement experienced by American Indians is perpetuated in the
US judicial system where it assumes the more subtle form of institutionalized
discrimination and racism." NATIONAL MINORITY ADVISORY COUNCIL ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1982). The inequality of justice: A report on crime and the
administration of justice in the minority community. THE NATIONAL INSTI-
TUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE. WASHINGTON, DC:
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 137.
207 See People v. Croy, 710 P.2d 392 (Cal. 1985).
208 ld.; RENTELN, supra note 132, at 37.
209 RENTELN, supra note132, at 37; Croy, 710 P.2d at 392. Compilations of
official and criminal justice data on the effects and consequences of crime
among Native Americans give insight into the continued victimization of Na-
tive Americans by the United States justice system. S. Perry, American Indi-
ans and crime: A BJS statistical profile, 1992-2002. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (2004) available at http://www.bjs
.gov/content/pub/pdf.aic02.pdf. National arrest figures show Native Ameri-
cans suffer disproportionate arrests for minor public offenses such as
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rick killed a police officer in what he claimed was self-defense.
In his 1979 trial, Patrick was convicted of murder and sentenced
to death, but six years later the California Supreme Court over-
turned his conviction and remanded for consideration of the
"'individualized' objective standard of reasonableness, which in-
cludes the individual's perception of both apprehension and im-
minent danger from the individual's own perspective."210 And
upon retrial, the jury acquitted Patrick Croy.211
Though the Williamses were not afforded this individualized
objective standard, the Washington Court of Appeals seemed to
express remorse for the devastating facts in it own way: the Wil-
liamses were sentenced to three years imprisonment with their
sentences suspended. In fact, the neither parent served a day
behind bars. What, then, is the purpose for such emotional legal
analysis contrasted with the traditional purposes of retribution?
Did the justice system's obligation to retribution override its ca-
pacity to express empathy and find a greater social accountabil-
ity? The Court of Appeals elaborated at length on the legal duty
of parents, more than what an evaluation of ordinary negligence
requires. Even so, the court was constrained by the law. It seems
that such rhetorical overcompensation was an effort rationalize
the lamentable circumstances and outcome and functioned as a
justification for the court's ultimate holding.
Shame is particularly relevant when considering the historical
and current social status of Native Americans. In the author's
opinion, this nation is due for a healthy dose of societal shame.
Traditionally, White Americans have been willfully indifferent
drunken driving, liquor law violations, and public drunkenness. In fact, law
enforcement agents are twice as likely to arrest Native Americans for violent
and property crimes than they are to arrest the greater US population. K.
Peak & J. Spencer, Crime in Indian Country: Another Trail of Tears, 15 J.
CRIM. JUST. 485-494 (1987); T. Minton, Jails in Indian Country, 2003. U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, (2005) available
at http://http://www.bjs.gov/contentlpub/pdf/icl3.pdf.
210 People v. Croy, 710 P.2d 392. (Cal. 1985)
211 Id.
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to uncomfortable facts revealing the truth of this country's past.
Such lack of shame has perpetuated a legacy of denial. An ex-
ample of this emotional vacancy was presented earlier in Chief
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in U.S. v. Sioux Nation. Chief Justice
Rehnquist defended and justified the Army's actions across thir-
teen pages in which not an ounce of shame is personally ex-
pressed. Instead, he wrote:
Different historians, not writing for the purpose of
having their conclusions or observations inserted
in the reports of congressional committees, have
taken different positions than those expressed in
some of the materials referred to in the Court's
opinion. This is not unnatural, since history, no
more than law, is not an exact (or for that matter
an inexact) science.212
Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist points out an insightful para-
dox: the study of law, similar to the study of history, is a fluid
and inexact science. Those who control the experiment control
the outcome. This outcome becomes a legacy and a foundation
upon which certain societies are built and other societies are
destroyed.
CONCLUSION
"Though many non-Native Americans have
learned very little about us, over time we have had
to learn everything about them. We watch their
films, read their literature, worship in their
churches, and attend their schools. Every third-
grade student in the United States is presented
with the concept of Europeans discovering
America as a "New World" with fertile soil, abun-
dant gifts of nature, and glorious mountains and
212 United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 435 (1980).
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rivers. Only the most enlightened teachers will ex-
plain that this world certainly wasn't new to the
millions of indigenous people who already lived
here when Columbus arrived." -Wilma
Mankiller213
United States policy has struggled to propose solutions as to
how our society should approach race. To the extent that any
solution may some day be possible, a society and its individuals
must first confront the uncomfortable possibility it may harbor
racial tendencies. Emotion within rhetoric reveals compelling
evidence of how racism continues to prevail in the law and
shape our society. Throughout history, the Supreme Court has
relied upon outdated doctrines of colonialism when deciding
contemporary issues relating to indigenous rights. As Native
American author and attorney Walter Echo-Hawk points out, it
becomes increasingly unseemly for courts "to wield such an out-
moded, inherently unjust, and oppressive set of legal doctrines
against a tiny minority of indigenous Americans." 214
Racism has no place in the legal system. As social psycholo-
gists and professors Samuel Sommers and Phoebe Ellsworth ar-
gue, an "explicit demonstration of racism is frowned upon in
most circles. But Whites' outward acceptance of a nonpreju-
diced value system has not led to the end of racial bias. Instead
• ..many modern Whites express [racial] sentiment through
more subtle, symbolic, or 'acceptable' means."21 5 These uncon-
213 Wilma Pearl Mankiller (November 18, 1945 - April 6, 2010) was the first
female Chief of the Cherokee Nation.
214 ECHO-HAWK, supra note 108, at 21. As previously mentioned, the Native
American and Hawaiian Natives population represents less than 1 percent of
the United States' population. Today, Native Americans are the most eco-
nomically disadvantaged group in the United States. The poverty rate for
Native American populations is more than double the poverty rate for the
overall US population. David V. Baker, American Indian Executions in His-
torical Context, 4 CRIM. JUST. STUDIES 351 (2007).
215 Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really
Know About Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Re-
search, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997, 1011 (2003) (Sommers and Ellsworth
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scious processes of racism should be combated with emotional
intelligence. But acknowledging racial bias in rhetoric comes
with its own risk: such revelations could further enable the legal
system to hide behind proper manipulation of language while
still encapsulating discreet racism. Despite this possibility, it is
this author's hope that the social debt owed to Native Ameri-
cans will someday be recognized and paid in full. Given the limi-
tations on our legal system, the best odds may be to begin with
individual education in hopes of effectuating a large-scale socie-
tal reform.
Volume 8, Number W
study racism within the context of "black" and "white," which is why [racial]
was used to replace "anti-Black," though its message is relevant to all forms
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